Prof. Bourbaki, Inventing frames & diffusing overflows, 2015. |
A logic of learning
One type of learning is 'learning by doing' in the sense familiar to economists as a downward shift of an average cost curve as a function of cumulative uninterrupted
production (Yelle, 1979). There is also learning in the sense of
(radical) innovation; Schumpeterian 'creative destruction' and 'novel
combinations'. The challenge is to explain the latter type of innovation
and learning. That is subject to uncertainty rather than risk. And the
point of uncertainty is that it yields the problem of induction or, more
precisely, the problem of 'abduction', as Peirce (1957) called it.
Quite apart from justifying a novelty once it is achieved, in the
'context of justification', how do you go about the development of
novelty, in the 'context of discovery'? How do you go from ('abduce
from') and existing working modus operandi to a new one that in
the future will turn out to be better but which now is not known? Of all
the new things you could think of doing, how do you choose the correct
one, or even one that is viable, and how do you know whether you know
all the options (Holland et al., 1989)? The problem of
uncertainty is precisely that you do not. This connects with and
important issue in Austrian economics: how is it that an entrepreneur
can be right s/he venture into new areas? In Herbert Simon's terms: if
uncertainty precludes the 'substantive' rationality of choosing the best
from available options, we need a 'procedural' rationality or
heuristic, in the form of some modus operandi that is likely to succeed.
Of
course, one possibility for a process of adjustment is random trial and
error. This would make economic evolution as blind as biological
evolution. And, indeed, the lack of rational evaluation by especially
small firms injects an element of randomness that contributes to
variety. But although rationality is bounded and entrepreneurship
entails an element of gambling, people do think, make inferences and
limit risk, and they are not always wrong. So how, as a firm, could one
go about 'abduction', and maximize chances of survival? Usually, the
answer in theories of abduction is to proceed via 'adjacent
possibilities': to project an existing practice into a context that is
sufficiently similar to have a chance of success, and allows for some
prediction of likely results, while it is sufficiently different to
yield novel experience and indications for further change with a chance
of success. That principle is extended below into a few basic principles
of a 'logic of development': principles that maximize the chance of
survival in an economic selection environment.
The
first requirement for survival is ongoing production during adaptation:
without it we starve even on the road to success. The second
requirement is adaptation to novel opportunities and threats. How to do
both? How to reconcile continuity and change? How to combine
exploitation with exploration? How to go from utilization of existing
resources to the development of new ones? The core principle here is that one should not surrender an existing way of doing things before both the motive and the opportunity
for a replacement are evident. Before the need arises such a move would
be wasteful, and before the opportunity arises it would be impossible.
Thus a certain amount of conservatism is rational, but it can easily
become excessive and block innovation. There is a trade-off between the
need to adapt and the costs involved in terms of uncertainty of whether
novelty will be successful, and uncertainty about the organizational
repercussions (March, 1991). To make the step to novel practice, one
must be prepared to 'unlearn' (Hedberg, 1981): no longer taking
established procedures for granted. Thus a necessary (but not always
sufficient) condition for innovation generally is that there is
perceived need, mostly from external pressure, a threat to continued
existence or a shortfall of performance below aspiration levels, as has
been the dominant in the literature on organizational learning (see the
survey by Cohen and Sproull, 1996).
The
following heuristic principles of development and learning are now
derived. The first principle of abduction is that one needs generalisation
of a successful practice to novel but 'adjacent' contexts, where it is
likely to succeed (so that it satisfies the requirements of ongoing
production), while it is also likely to run into its limitations, so
that we may discover the boundaries of its validity (so that it
contributes to the requirement of exploration). Next, as the practice
runs into its limitations, it should be adapted to the local context to
solve them. This is the principle of differentiation. Again,
attempts to adapt contribute to ongoing production as a condition for
survival as well as adaptation. Typically, such adaptations are inspired
by comparisons with similar, 'adjacent' practices, which in the given
context are in some respects more successful, and elements from these
more successful practices are imported into the local context at hand.
This exchange of elements from different parallel practices, in a given
context, is the principle of reciprocation. In language,
reciprocation is the operation of metaphor or analogy. As the practice
becomes more and more differentiated across contexts, efficiency losses
appear owing to lack of standardization, economies of scale foregone,
complexity of ad hoc add-ons. Novel elements inserted from
outside often do not fit well in the structure of current practice, and
for the full utilization of their potential require a more fundamental
restructuring of practices in a novel practice. This is the principle of
novel combinations or accommodation. This is where the previous
preparatory steps lead to novelty. But then, at first, the novelty is
indeterminate. Knowledge is partly or wholly tacit: to the extent that
novelty works, it cannot yet be fully explained. Much experimentation is
needed to find its best form(s), for the novelty to 'come into its
own', and to become standardized in a 'dominant design' (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978). This is the principle of consolidation. After
that has been achieved, one can move into the next cycle of development,
starting with generalization. What feeds exploration while maintaining
exploitation is an alternation of variety of practice and variety of
context. The resulting cycle of learning is illustrated in Figure 1.
The claim is that this procedure is the best answer to the problem of
how to maintain continuity (exploitation) while preparing for change
(exploration).
The
hypothesis now is that these principles of abduction, being conducive
to survival, constitute a fundamental 'logic' or heuristic of
development which is applicable, with appropriate elaborations and
enrichments, at all levels of learning/development/adaptation, and at
the level of individual people, organizations, industries and national
economies. Thus it should, among other things, serve to specify the
relation between equilibrating (Walrasian, Austrian) entrepreneurship
and dis-equilibrating Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. Furthermore, this
'logic' should also help to indicate how in processes of development the
different levels of people, firms, industries and national or regional
economic systems tie into each other. Of course, the hypothesis has to
be argued more in detail and then tested extensively. The hypothesis has
been inspired by the work of the developmental psychologist Jean Piaget
(1970, 1974; Flavell, 1967) on individual cognition.
Note
that, while in a procedural sense the heuristic is optimal, it need not
yield a unique or optimal outcome. It allows for path-dependence and
suboptimal outcomes, and the path taken depends on context and
coincidence. Different economies can develop different structures.
'Logic' is put between quotation marks because it is a heuristic rather
than a logic in the sense of indicating a sequence of stages that is
logically or epistemologically necessary. It is a heuristic in the sense
that it is generally the best answer to the problem of abduction; the
best way of exploring while maintaining exploitation. However, stages
will overlap: there is generalization during consolidation,
differentiation during generalization, exploration of novel combinations
during reciprocation. Stages may occasionally even be skipped, and
innovation can occur less systematically, more randomly and
spontaneously (Cook and Yanow, 1993), when an obvious opportunity
presents itself without much exploration. But as a general rule one
needs to accumulate failures to build up the need for change, as well as
hints at what directions to look in: indications of what changes could
be made with some chance of success.
Bart Nooteboom, Innovation, Learning and Industrial Organization, Camb. J. Econ. 23, 1999, pp.131-133.
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